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Her Majesty The Queen and the Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Albert Helmut Rauca: 1 : International 
Law—N ationality—J urisdiction—Extradition.
CASE SUMMARY
The fugitive, Albert Helm ut Rauca, was apprehended  un d er a s. 10 
w arrant o f  the Extradition Act'2 issued Ju n e  17. 1982 bv Parker A.C.J.H.C.. 
Rauca was accused o f the extraditable crim e o f aiding and abetting the 
m urder of approximately I0,50() persons between 1941 and 1943 in Kaunas. 
Lithuania. T he Federal Republic o f Germany (the “Requesting State") sought 
the extradition o f the f ugitive f rom  C anada (the “Requested State") on the 
basis o f an extradition treaty between the two States en tered  into force in 
1979 (hereinafter re fe rred  to as the "T rea ty”).' It was subm itted by the 
Requesting State that the crim e was com m itted within its jurisdiction.
Lithuania was invaded by G erm any in 1941. Between 1941 and 1943. 
the fugitive was alleged to have been a m em ber of the Einsatzgruppen in 
Lithuania, a specialized g roup  whose duties included the destruction of 
“racially inferior" groups. In 1950, Rauca came to Ganada and became a 
citizen.
At trial before Evans C. J.H .C., the fugitive was com m itted for su rren ­
d er as the evidence was sufficient to justify a prima facie case against him 
for the alleged crimes. O n appeal to the O ntario  C ourt of Appeal, this 
decision was affirm ed. Briefly, there were two main argum ents on behalf 
of the accused. First, it was argued  that the Extradition Act (which im ple­
m ented the Treaty) was inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, as its application restricted the fugitive’s right to mobility (s.fi) as 
a C anadian national, and therefore , was inapplicable. The C ourts re­
sponded to this C harter argum ent by essentially stating that the fugitive's 
extradition was a limitation “dem onstrably justified" in the circumstances 
(as outlined by s. 1 o f the Charter). The second argum ent was that the 
Requesting State lacked jurisdiction to request extradition of the fugitive 
as the crimes were com m itted in Lithuania. As to this argum ent, both the 
High C lourt and the Court of Appeal determ ined  that there was sufficient 
jurisdiction in the Requesting State to allow extradition.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Extradition
T he history o f the C anadian Extradition Act is a long one reaching back to 
1870.4 Essentially, the Act attem pts to provide in Part I (with which we are 
here concerned) for two things. First, it attem pts to delineate a standard  
procedure for extradition. Second, it sets out the “m achinery" for im ple­
m enting extradition arrangem ents such as the T reaty  in this case.'1 Such 
an approach, in short, recognizes that the practice o f extradition in C anada 
depends prim arily upon the existence o f bilateral treaties'* and  that con­
stitutionally, while the executive has the power to form  such treaties, they 
must be im plem ented by the Parliam ent o f C anada.7
T h ere  are no specific provisions in the Act dealing with either the 
question o f nationality o r jurisdiction. These m atters (and o ther substantive 
m atters) are generally found in the relevant extradition treaty.K
With respect to the application of the Extradition Act and questions of 
nationality, it is clear that the practice in Com monwealth countries such as 
Britain and  Canada has been to allow extradition of its nationals." A num ber 
o f o ther countries, including the Requesting State, do not allow extradition 
of nationals. It would appear that the policy favouring the barring of 
extradition in the case of nationals is that a national should be protected
bv the laws of his sovereign and not removed from  his “natural judges.....
I he opposite viewpoint (being the Canadian approach) seems to be m ore 
rational.
In the first place, barring extradition on the basis of nationaliu  gives 
the fugitive im m unity purely because of an accident of b irth ."  As well, 
while the national is entitled to the protection of his sovereign, he himself 
owes a dutv of obedience to the laws of the territory in which he finds 
himself .1- Further, in most extradition treaties (including that in the present
'F o r  .i d is cuss io n  <>t (h e  historv o l e x t r a d i t io n  it. C a n a d a .  \ e e  M ag o n e .  I xtt a d i tm n  < ( H K 17‘t ( I ' ( 2 ‘>i
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case), the national receives adequate protection since there is a discretion 
left to the executive to refuse the extradition o f  a national.11’ T hus, the 
C anadian approach  has been to allow the extradition o f nationals in ap ­
p ropria te  circum stances. T h e  case law clearly supports this principle as In 
Re Burley14 shows:
W hatever may he considered to have been the general rule in relation to a 
G overnm ent surrendering its own subjects to a foreign governm ent. I can­
not say that I have any doubt that under the Treaty and our Statute, a 
British subject who is in other respects brought within the law, cannot legallv 
dem and that he ought not to be surrendered m erely because he is a natural 
born subject o f  Her M ajesty.1'
T he requirem ent o f jurisdiction in extradition m eans essentially that 
the crim e m ust be com m itted within the jurisdiction (or “territo ry”) o f the 
Requesting State. N um erous cases establish this fundam ental principle"' 
and extradition treaties almost invariably provide such a requirem ent. In 
general, the extradition crim e is com m itted within the territory  (national 
boundaries) o f  the Requesting State and  thus creates no problem . However, 
in certain circum stances, such as those in the present case, there arises a 
problem  as to jurisdiction where the crim e is com m itted within a territory 
which is not u n d er the de jure control o f the Requesting State at the time 
the crim e is com m itted and only de facto control exists. In Schtraks v. (iov- 
em m ent of Israel'1, the House o f Lords clearly laid down the principle that 
extradition may be gran ted  notw ithstanding a lack o f de jure sovereignty 
and that only a de facto jurisdiction is recognized. An additional problem  
unique to the Federal Republic o f Germ any questions its ability to prosecute 
offences com m itted un d er the authority  o f the T h ird  Reich. It would ap ­
pear that a num ber o f States have recognized this jurisdiction.18
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
On April 17, 1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came 
into force. T h e  relevant sections 1 and 6(1) which read as follows:
I . I h e  C a n a d i a n  C h a r t e r  o f  R ig h ts  a n d  F r e e d o m s  g u a r a n t e e s  t h e  r i g h t s  
a n d  f r e e d o m s  set o u t  in it sub je c t  o n ly  to  su c h  r e a s o n a b le  lim its  p r e ­
s e n t e d  bv law as c a n  Ik* d e m o n s t r a b l y  ju s t i h e d  in a f r e e  a n d  dem<K ra t i i  
soc ie ty
H(l). Fverv citizen of Canada has the* light to enter, remain in and leave 
Canada.
'■'Article V. \upra  to o l  n o te  .‘V
'♦< in h fD . I c  i .  | :v i
• 'See <1W3>. 1 C .C .C .  (3 d)  M ’> at 404 (O u t  C.A.)
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Kowrkrrhrlko .-i ( .  ir tnu itu i. | I 9 H 2 |  \  ( . 7h See  (list ussion  in I.A K OR K SI  . \upru  tool n o te  t al
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Since the com ing into force o f  the C harter, there have been num erous 
attem pts to test the scope o f its application. T h e  present case however is 
one o f the few giving consideration to the m eaning o f s. 1, clearly the most 
im portan t section for all practical purposes.
Present Case: Charter
In both the O ntario  High C ourt and  the O ntario  Court o f Appeal, 
Mr. Rauca claimed that the extradition o f a Canadian national would violate 
the right o f mobility as guaranteed  by s.6 o f the Charter. This argum ent 
failed at ly 'th levels.
T he issue was divided into two parts by both courts, the first m atter 
being to establish w hether a guaran teed  right had been infringed. T he 
onus was prima facie on Rauca to show that his mobility rights as a C anadian 
citizen had been infringed. Both courts accepted that, prima fa n e , ex tra­
dition urn such an infringem ent. T h e  second part concerns w hether the 
infringem ent is “dem onstrably justified”; the onus being on the Federal 
Democratic Republic to show that the limitation of this right falls within 
section 1 o f  the C harter.
In determ ining  w hether the Republic had discharged the onus, the 
courts looked at different materials. Fvans C.J.H.C. determ ined that in 
o rd er to satisfy the onus, the Republic must show that the limits imposed 
by the extradition  laws are: reasonable, prescribed bv law, and dem onstr­
ably justified in a free and dem ocratic society.1'*
Evans C.J.H.C. read s. 1 and s.(>( I ) together, making s. 1 the overriding 
provision, and thereby restricting the o ther rights and freedom s in the 
Charter.-’" He developed a test of what am ounts to demonstrably justified:
I h r  p h r a s e ,  “ r e a s o n a b le  l im its"  in s. 1 i i i j x u t s  a n  obje< t i \ e  test of v a l id i t \
It is t h e  j u d g e  w h o  d e t e r m i n e s  w h e t h e r  a “ l im it"  as  f o u n d  in leg is la t ion  is 
r e a s o n a b le  o r  u n r e a s o n a b le .  I lie q u e s t io n  is n o t  w h e t h e r  t h e  j u d g e  a g r e e s  
w ith  t h e  l im i ta t io n  b u t  w h e t h e r  h e  c o n s i d e r s  th a t  t h e r e  is a  r a t i o n a l  b a s i s  
fo r  it— a bas is  t h a t  w o u ld  Ik* r e g a r d e d  as  l>eing w i th in  t h e  b o u n d s  of r e a s o n  
b \  ( a i r - m i n d e d  p e o p l e  a c c u s t o m e d  to  t h e  n o r m s  of ,i ( r e e  a n d  d e m o c ra t i c  
s«x ie t \  I h a t  is t h e  cru< ible in w hie h t h e  ( one e p t  of r e a s o n a b le n e s s  m u s t  Ik* 
t e s te d . - '
Evans C.J.H.C. suggested th.it reference be m.idt* to o th e r  legal systems 
with similar principles. He states:
I h e  c o u r t  m u s t  d e c i d e  w h a t  is a t e a s o n a b l e  limit m  a ( r e e  a n d  d e m o c ra t ic  
soc ietv bv r e fe re n c  e  to  ( Canadian soc ie t \  a n d  b \  t h e  applic  a t io n  of p r in t  ip les  
of  poli t ical  sc ience .  C r i t e r i a  bv whic h t h e s e  \ a l u e s  a i r  to  be* as sessed  a r e  to
»•*( 18 O  K (2<1) p 7t»r> .it 71». 
•“"Ihut p 714-715»
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be found within the charter itself , which m eans that the courts are entitled  
to look at those s<x ieties in which as a m atter o f  com m on law f reedom s and 
dem ocratic rights similar to those referred to in the Charter are enjoyed."
However, he in fact m ade his final decision 011 the C harter issue without 
using such a com parative analysis. Evans C.J.H .C. does not give very clear 
reasons for his decision, but, he appears to base his determ ination upon 
the past practice o f  extradition:
I am satisfied that such statutory restriction which has as its objective, 
the protection and preservation of society from  serious crim inal activity, is 
o ne which m em bers of a f ree and dem ocratic society such as Canada could  
accept and em brace. T o  hold otherw ise would be to declare that a procedure  
which has been accepted in our country for over a century and in most 
other dem ocratic societies is no longer a reasonable and proper m ethod of 
protecting our society from  serious crim inal activities.-M
I he C ourt o f Appeal follows a similar approach in requiring the Fed­
eral Democratic Republic to satisfy the onus o f showing that the inf ringe­
ment is dem onstrably justified. However in their determ ination the court 
considers a wider breadth  of variables. T he court looks at several cases 
which consider the past practice in extradition law and international law.-' 
T he C ourt of A ppeal, as distinguished from  the High C ourt, placed some 
em phasis upon international law and  discussed it in the decision.
With regard  to international law, the court begins by stating that “no 
international convention written or otherw ise militates against the ex tra­
dition of a Stale's own nationals.”-’’ I he court looked at the International 
Covenant on C ivil and Political Rights and  the European Convention of Human 
Rights. T he court then held that m unicipal laws are the only real source of 
substantive law of extradition—not international law. I he courts’ use of 
international law in this case is not particularly illuminating.
It would appear again that the court bases its decision 011 past practice, 
our obligations at international law and the purpose of the Extradition A ct:
It is not necessan  to turn to lengthv die tionar\ definitions ol the words 
'dem onstrabU justified'. I he\ are w o id s of com m on understanding and  
usage and th e\ place a significant burden 011 the proponents of the lim iting 
legislation. W hen the rationale and purpose of the Extradition Act and treatv 
under it are looked .11 (h a \in g  in m ind that < 1 ime should not go unpunished), 
Canada's obligations to the international com m unity considered and the 
history of such legislation in free and dem ocralit societies exam ined , in our 
view, the burden of establishing that the limit im posed by the Extradition  
Act and the treatv 011 s.b( 1) of the Charter is a reasonable one dem onstrably 
justified in a free and dem ocratu scxietv has been discharged bv the re­
spondents.-"
Ibul p  7l l i  
-’Vfru/. p  717
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It is also felt that, at this level, there is a leap in reasoning from  the 
discussion to the decision. It would seem that a variety o f instrum ents are 
discussed (e.g. the international covenants) and a decision is then given 
without any em phasis upon the reasons. At both court levels it appears 
that there are difficulties in explaining the reasons for reaching a decision.
JURISDICTION
Before considering the courts' approach to this issue, it is necessary to 
m ention some o f  the relevant facts concerning jurisdiction. As we have 
seen, the alleged “m urders” o f 10.500 persons occurred in Kaunas. Lith­
uania between 1941 and 1943. T h e  evidence from  the reported  decisions 
regarding jurisdiction is as follows: On Ju n e  22, 1941, the G erm an Army 
invaded Lithuania and by the end  o f that m onth, the G erm an forces were 
in com plete control o f the country and rem ained as such until August 1944. 
There was no o ther governm ent in power in Lithuania. L ithuania was 
subject to G erm an adm inistration, the G erm an Civil Code and Code o f 
Criminal Procedure. As to the position o f the Requesting State itself, the 
evidence established that they have consistently affirm ed their competency 
to prosecute National Socialist crimes o f violence. O ne of the expert wit­
nesses in the case stated by way o f affidavit that the G erm an Reich and the 
Federal Republic o f G erm any were essentially identical.27
On the basis of these outlined facts, both the O ntario  High C ourt and 
the C ourt of Appeal came to the conclusion that the Requesting State had 
sufficient jurisdiction to try the fugitive for the alleged crimes. In short, 
the issue can really be divided into two questions. First, did the Germ an 
Reich (i.e. the G erm any before 1945) have sufficient control over Lithuania 
during  the time in question to establish jurisdiction over Rauca? Secondly, 
what is the relationship between the G erm any of World W ar II and the 
Requesting State?
4
In the O ntario  High C ourt. Kvans C.J.H.C. came to the conclusion 
that deJacto control of a territory created sufficient jurisdiction to deal with 
the accused fugitive and as suc h, the Requesting Slate had suffic ient juris­
diction; a de jure jurisdiction not being necessarv:
(k-mii.tin w as m de facto tn i up.i t  ion  of  L i th u a n ia  in I'M I It was p a r t  of t h e  
(>(-1111.111 t e n  itoi  \ ot ( >(-rman\ t In o u ^ h  ( oiMjuest I h e  l a d  th a t  it was lo t  ( e d  
at a late!  d a t e  to  r e l i n q u is h  p o ss e s s io n  d o e s  no t  a l tc i  t h e  !a<t tha t  at t h e  
r e le v a n t  t im e ,  it was ( • e n n a n  t e n i t o i v . ' "
Similiarlv. the Court of Appeal found that the Requesting State had 
jurisdic tion to tr \  Rauca. In analv/ing this issue, the Court m ade reference 
to the case of Schtraks and the American case of In Re R \a n .w Schtraks in
- '(19X2). <(!( K (3(1)97.11 I d ' ) - 107 l( >ni I K  I ). (19X3). ! ( ( . . ( :  (3d)  3X5 al 393  305 (O n)  ( \ )  
-"< 19X2). 30 ( K (3d  1 ‘*7 .11 I0<> 107 
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particular makes it very clear that a de facto control is sufficient to establish 
jurisdiction for purposes o f extradition. T he  C ourt o f Appeal concluded 
as follows:
T h e  evidence establishes that the place where the alleged offen ces took  
place was occupied  and under the de facto control o f  Germ any. In our  
opin ion , “territory” as used in the treaty under consideration includes those  
areas occupied  and under the dr facto  control o f  Germ any during the Second  
W orld War. We therefore are o f  the view that Evans C.J.H .C. was right in 
hold ing that the R equesting State had jurisdiction to seek extradition o f  the  
fugitive.*’
As to the second aspect o f  the issue o f jurisdiction; i.e., w hether o r not 
the Requesting State was in a position to prosecute as the successor o r 
“identical state personality” o f the G erm an Reich, both courts are silent. 
T he only com m ent which might be said to have been m ade with respect 
to this m atter was by the C ourt o f  Appeal as follows:
. . . the Republic o f  G erm any has recognized that it has an obligation to 
punish G erm an personnel who com m itted such crim es and that it is a proper  
place (although perhaps not the only one) for the trial of m en and w om en  
charged with such o ffen ces, for a G erm an national is bv the Germ an law 
punishable there for such crim es w herever com m itted .11
ASSESSMENT
T h e determ ination o f this issue on the C harter is one o f quite m o­
m entous proportions when one reflects upon the possible outcom e o f this 
case. Had the courts determ ined  that the C harter had been violated and 
that the Extradition Act and the "T reaty” were inapplicable to a C anadian 
national. C anada would have been faced with the prospect o f actually pros­
ecuting a Nazi f ugitive for war crimes com m itted du rin g  the Second World 
War.*'2
T h ere  can be no doubt that the decision o f the C ourt o f Appeal as to 
the C harter and its application to the extradition of C anadian nationals is 
fundam entally correct.”  Both courts have determ ined that the practice o f 
extraditing  C anadian nationals for crimes com m itted abroad is one that 
has been accepted by Canadians as being “dem onstrably justified”. Frankly, 
why the issue was raised and why the court spent so m uch time dealing 
with it is somewhat mystifying, as the answer to Rauca’s argum ent seems 
perfectly clear. His argum ent is analogous to that o f an accused in a crim inal 
case who argues that his rights of mobility have been infringed. (An even
"'Ihid  . a I lO'l 
" Ih u i
’*'( >i . il tri  n a t iv e k  . R a m .1 w ou ld  g o  u n m e d  a n d  u n p u n i s h e d :  see ( AS I 'LL A N D  W I L L I A M S ,  ( CANADIAN 
( RIM I NAI  LAW I N I  L R N  A I U )\ AL AND TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS, M6>S47 (IM I).
"  I lu- a p p r o a c h  of th e  c o u r t s  lias 111 f a d  Ik*»-11 fo llowed recen llv  in a Nova Si o li a  e x t r a d i t io n  case. See  He 
llrtle i and I m h d  Slates nf l merita  ( l ‘Wl) . I IH 1) 1 K ( ‘id i  t ‘M> (N S S.( I I).).
better exam ple o f  the m eaning o f “dem onstrably justified” is given by the 
Court o f Appeal as follows: “A readily dem onstrable exam ple o f this is 
‘freedom  o f speech’ which is limited o r qualified by the laws o f defam ation, 
obscenity, sedition, etc.”)’4
More im portant, however, than the actual outcom e o f the decision in 
this case, is the technique o f  in terpretation that is used; i.e., the prelim inary 
determ ination that a guaran teed  right prim a facie has been infringed and 
then a consideration o f w hether that infringem ent is dem onstrablv justified. 
T hat this approach is logical cannot be denied.
A nother aspect o f the C harte r argum ent to which some com m ents 
should be directed concerns the use o f international legislation and com­
parative legislation. Reference has already been m ade to the com m ents of 
Evans C. J.H.C., suggesting a use o f com parative analysis and his own lack 
of reliance 011 such an approach. T h e  C ourt o f Appeal m ade reference to 
international legislation in its in terpre tation  of the C harter, but this re f­
erence is at best cursory and does no m ore than to support what had already 
been decided. T h e  decision o f the C ourt was by no means based upon suc h 
international legislation, and the m ention m ade seems almost in deference 
to its existence as opposed to its im portance. If criticism can be directed 
toward the C harter argum ent, it is with respect to the lack of use of in ter­
national legislation in in terpretation. This criticism is particularly true  in 
this case since the crimes with which the fugitive was charged have been a 
m atter o f concern at international law since W orld War I !.■'*’ In ef fect, the 
crimes with which Rauca was charged in this case were m ore international 
in nature than domestic, and as such, international law might have been 
given a greater recognition by the court.
As to the issue of jurisdiction, little need he said bv wav o f assessment. 
T he courts in analv/ing this m atter do not reallv give a com plete answer 
to the two questions raised by the issue. ((I) Did the T h ird  Reich have 
sufficient control over Lithuania du ring  the time in question to establish 
jurisdiction over the fugitive? (2) What is the relationship between the 
Germ any of W orld W ar II and the Requesting State?). While the courts 
clearly answer the fust question based upon such authority as Schtraks. 
the answer to the second question is never expressly given, it is merely 
assumed. This is not to say that the conclusion is incorrect, but only that 
the reasoning behind it is lacking. As stated, it would appear that the ( lourt 
of Appeal is recognizing the general competency of the Federal Republic 
in m atters of this natu re  although it never explicitly makes this point.
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C O N CLUSIO N
In general, it m ight he said that the decisions o f  both courts in this 
case are well-reasoned, subject only to the com m ents already made. By way 
o f conclusion, reference should be m ade to two very general questions that 
arise because o f the decision in this case. T h e  first relates to the m atter of 
extradition itself in a very wide sense. It is clear that there has been a 
stretching o f the norm al conception of jurisdiction to ensure that Kauca 
fits within the provisions o f the extradition treaty between the Federal 
Republic o f  G erm any and C anada. O ne can only question w hether this in 
fact achieves the fundam ental purpose o f extradition which, as the Court 
o f Appeal notes, is to re tu rn  the fugitive to the state most com petent to 
try him for the of fences in question. W hether o r not West Germ any is the 
most com petent jurisdiction to try these offences is difficult to answer. 
However, it is suggested that it is certainly preferable to a trial in Canada 
for the substantive crimes in question.
T he second m atter of interest concerns the interpretation of the Charter 
and its implications. Surely, no one would seriously argue that the courts 
in this case were incorrect in their decision. However, this realization in 
itself raises a fundam ental question as to the C harter and its fu tu re appli­
cation, namely, was the C harter in tended to change the lights enjoyed In 
Canadian nationals o r merely to codify what rights were thought to exist? 
Perhaps it is too early to speculate on this question. However, the decisions 
of both the High C ourt and  the C ourt of Appeal in this case would seem 
to suggest that it is merelv a codification. This suggestion appears most 
vividly in the continuing em phasis of the courts that the infringem ent was 
demonstrablv justified because the practice of extraditing  nationals has 
existed for over a cen tu rv . In term s of fu tu re implications, this would seem 
to indicate that the C harter does not change the existing practices of law.
N evertheless, the C h attel was not enacted 111 a vat num. and the rights set 
(»in therein must Ik* inlet preted ralionalh : h a \m g  regard to the thru existing  
laws. and. in the instant case, to (lit- position that ( anada o ttu p ie s  hi the 
wot Id and the el te n s  of the m ultitude of exit adit ion ti eat it's it has had \\ itli 
other nations.17
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